

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 14 October 2010 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

This is to inform you that Mr. Masahiko Asada (Japan, expert on nuclear issues) and Mr. Victor Comras (United States of America, expert on finance), whom I appointed on 8 July 2010 to serve on the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), have withdrawn from the Panel. Accordingly, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I wish to inform you that I have appointed Mr. George Lopez (United States of America, expert on finance) and Mr. Takehiro Yamamoto (Japan, expert on nuclear issues), to serve on the Panel of Experts and carry out tasks as specified in paragraph 26 of the resolution.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon



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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested that it be kept regularly informed of progress made in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan. The report provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous report, dated 19 July 2010 (S/2010/388), as well as an update on the activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) through 30 September 2010.

II. Political developments

Referendum preparations

2. While the Sudan's political focus has shifted largely to the upcoming referendums, disagreements between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties continued to delay technical preparations for the referendum process. In the case of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, following its establishment on 28 June, a dispute arose between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties over who should be appointed to serve as Secretary-General of the Commission. This dispute remained unresolved during July and August and prevented the Commission from commencing operations for most of the reporting period.

3. On 9 August, the members of the Juba-based Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau were sworn in, followed by the swearing in of the members of the Southern State High Committee on 23 August. On 29 August, the Presidency agreed to a joint proposal by UNMIS and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel to vest the Commission's executive, administrative and operational functions in four separate posts, including Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General, Chief Referendum Operations Officer and Deputy Chief Referendum Operations Officer. It was also agreed that two of these posts would be filled by Northerners and two by Southerners. On 14 September, Mohamed Osman al-Noujoumi was appointed by the Presidency to serve as Secretary-General of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission.

4. The United Nations is in the process of deploying an additional 596 security, logistics and technical personnel, including United Nations Volunteers, to UNMIS to assist in providing technical and logistical support to the Referendum Commissions.



and their subcommittees, including at the county level. Close to 60 per cent of this personnel have already deployed or are in the process of deploying to UNMIS. UNMIS is also establishing new referendum support bases to provide support at the county level in southern Sudan. Construction of the first referendum support base has been completed, with six more scheduled for completion by the end of September and the rest to be put in place by the end of October. All eight additional helicopters required for the transportation of referendum-related personnel and materials have arrived in the country and the Mission expects to complete their final placement by 1 October.

5. Supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems has secured office premises for the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Referendum Base in Juba, and has begun procuring office equipment for these two bodies. The UNMIS/UNDP integrated referendum support team has prepared operational plans, including for training and logistics support, voter registration manuals, and internal regulations for consideration by the Commission. The United Nations is also facilitating the official travel of the referendum authorities and has co-hosted the Southern Sudan Referendum Base and the State High Committees' induction workshops. On 13 September, the United Nations and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems held their first formal technical meeting with the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and the newly designated Secretary-General to discuss matters such as the referendum timeline, procurement specifications, and the budget.

6. On 28 September, the Chairperson of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission stated that voter registration for the referendum was likely to begin in the second half of November. The United Nations and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems are in the process of drafting procedures and specifications for the procurement of registration materials, and have already begun contacting potential manufacturers in anticipation of a request by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission for support.

7. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties have made no progress on referendum preparations in Abyei since the adoption of the Abyei Referendum Act in December 2009. Although the parties continue to voice their public commitment to the 22 July 2009 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Abyei Protocol, including the referendum timetable, they have not been able to agree on a chairperson for the Abyei Referendum Commission. Any further delay by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties in establishing the Commission will jeopardize the holding of the Abyei referendum within the envisioned timeline. UNMIS, together with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel and other international partners, will continue their efforts to assist the parties in breaking the current deadlock.

8. On 21 September, in response to a request from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties, I announced the establishment of a three-member panel, headed by the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, to monitor the southern Sudan and Abyei referendums. The two other members of the panel are Antonio Monteiro, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and Bhojraj Pokharel, former Chairman of the Election Commission of Nepal. The panel will make periodic visits to the Sudan throughout the period leading up to the

referendums. Panel members will engage with all relevant actors, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties, the Referendum Commissions, civil society and observer groups. In addition to reporting to me on the conduct of the referendums, the panel will work to enhance confidence in the process by encouraging the parties and relevant authorities to take corrective measures to resolve any significant problems or disputes that may arise.

Negotiations on post-referendum arrangements

9. Based on the 23 June memorandum of understanding signed in Mekelle, Ethiopia, at the facilitation of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, on the structure of the negotiation of post-referendum arrangements, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties officially launched negotiations on post-referendum arrangements on 10 July. Although the parties have made progress in defining procedural issues related to the conduct of the negotiations, they have made little progress in reaching agreement on key substantive issues. On 19 July, with the support of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel and UNMIS, the parties convened a workshop on the theme "Issues exposure workshop" to mark the beginning of the substantive phase, of the negotiations, during which they agreed on an initial schedule and procedural details for four working groups on wealth-sharing, citizenship, security and international legal instruments. The working groups, which have so far exclusively consisted of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties, met on 9 and 10 August and have continued to meet sporadically since that time. The parties also agreed to establish a joint secretariat for the negotiations, but have not yet done so.

Border demarcation

10. The Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee remains deadlocked on two primary issues: the number of contested areas to be forwarded to the Presidency for a final decision and the extent of international involvement in the physical demarcation process. On 29 August, the Presidency called upon the Border Committee to redouble its efforts and established a joint political committee, comprised of both Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties.

Abyei

11. Conditions in Abyei remained tense during the reporting period. An attack on Tagalei, north of Abyei town, on 5 July by unidentified armed elements left seven civilians and one policeman dead and contributed to a general feeling of insecurity among the population. Lack of progress on referendum preparations, Misseriya frustrations over fears of their inability to migrate to the south this year, and rumours of Misseriya plans to organize large-scale settlements in the northern parts of the Abyei area have further polarized the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka ethnic groups and hardened their positions on key issues. The Misseriya paramount chief and other tribal leaders in Muglad, who had initially focused attention on the issue of voter eligibility, have begun to reject the referendum entirely and have consolidated their opposition to the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on Abyei's borders. Some local Ngok Dinka political actors in Abyei have suggested that the Abyei Administration should conduct the referendum on its own, or unilaterally declare its intention to join the south, if lack of progress in referendum preparations persists.

Southern Kordofan

12. In accordance with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/National Congress Party (NCP) agreement to postpone elections in Southern Kordofan until a new census is done, the National Elections Commission conducted a new state-wide census exercise between 15 and 29 June with critical logistical support from UNMIS. Both the national and state governments provided significant support in effectively mobilizing census staff, despite the onset of the rainy season and logistical constraints. Both Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties expressed satisfaction with the process. The census results, which were scheduled to be released in July 2010 have not yet been released, primarily because the Bureau of Statistics has still not provided the preliminary figures. Voter registration for the elections is currently scheduled for November 2010 and polling for February 2011.

Popular consultations

13. As requested by the local governments in both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, UNMIS is working closely with the Peace Research Institute of the University of Khartoum to help identify issues expected to emerge during the popular consultations process in the two States. Decentralization, distribution of resources, land, security and cultural identity are likely to be the main issues.

14. The parties have made some progress in technical preparations for the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan, notwithstanding the delayed elections. At a three-day civic education workshop in early June, both the Governor and the Deputy Governor emphasized the need to work together, leading the attendees to adopt a code of conduct and simplified definition of the popular consultation concept to be used during the civic education campaign. During the reporting period, UNMIS facilitated workshops in locations throughout the State, including Al Fula, Abu Gebiha, Dilling and Kadugli, with more workshops planned through to December.

15. The Blue Nile State Assembly appointed a 20-member Popular Consultation Commission in early September, which will conduct the exercise over the following three months. Uncertainty over the Commission's funding, however, remains a significant concern.

Wealth-sharing

16. According to the Petroleum Unit of the Government of Southern Sudan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the national Government transferred \$621.07 million in oil revenues to the Government of Southern Sudan in the second quarter of 2010. An additional transfer of \$77.77 million was also made in July, leading to a cumulative total of \$1.368 billion between January and July 2010. This includes withdrawals of \$500.29 million from the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and \$90.12 million as settlement of arrears.

17. The national Government continues to transfer revenue shares to oil-producing States. According to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, during the second quarter of 2010, Unity State received approximately \$13.04 million, Upper Nile State \$25.69 million, and Southern Kordofan State \$9.17 million. Pursuant to the Abyei Protocol, Warab State, local Ngok Dinka and local Misseriya were entitled to a total of approximately \$1.34 million during the same period. However, the transfer of Misseriya shares is awaiting a decision of the Presidency, and the

Abyei Area Administration has claimed that it has not received the designated shares for the Ngok Dinka.

Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement

18. The political and security situation in eastern Sudan remained stable during the reporting period, although the eastern Sudanese parties continued to accuse the Government of failing to meet its obligations under the East Sudan Peace Agreement regarding eastern representation in the national civil service. They also complained that there has not been any contribution from the Government to development in these areas. The East Sudan Peace Agreement signatories are currently focused on preparations for a donor conference on eastern Sudan in Kuwait.

Darfur peace process

19. During the reporting period, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur continued to pursue his three-strand strategy to ensure the involvement of civil society in the peace process; facilitate the negotiation of a peace agreement between the belligerent parties through an inclusive process; and encourage the improvement of regional relations between Chad, the Sudan and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. From 12 to 15 July, the Joint African Union/United Nations Joint Mediation, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Government of Qatar organized a second Darfur civil society conference in Doha. Approximately 350 Darfuris attended, representing a wide cross section of society, including important ethnic and tribal communities, internally displaced people, refugees, women, the youth, traditional leaders, pastoralists, civil society organizations, intellectuals and the diaspora.

20. In the first half of July, the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) continued negotiations, under the auspices of the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator, in the areas of power-sharing and the administrative status of Darfur; wealth-sharing, including land rights; compensation and the return of IDPs and refugees; security arrangements; justice and reconciliation; and resolution of disputes. From the end of July, the Joint Mediation worked to consolidate the work of the joint LJM-Government of the Sudan committees to develop a draft agreement, also taking into account previously concluded peace agreements; the framework agreements reached in Doha; the actions taken by the parties to implement the framework agreements; the recommendations of the two civil society conferences held in Doha; and the Sudan People's Initiative. Once finalized, the draft will be shared with the parties.

21. To make the process inclusive, the Joint Mediation has continued to pursue efforts to persuade the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid el-Nur, and to join the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Khalil Ibrahim, to rejoin the talks.

III. Security developments

22. The security situation in southern Sudan continues to be of concern. Violent challenges to election results by former Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and SPLM affiliates continued in southern Sudan. As at 20 September, the conflict

between Lieutenant General George Athor and SPLA forces in northern Jonglei State remained unresolved. On 8 August, SPLA forces detained a helicopter of Sudan Airways that had deviated from its stated flight route at Paloich, Upper Nile State, en route to Khartoum. SPLA alleged that the helicopter was transporting supplies to General Athor. An Area Joint Military Committee tasked to investigate the incident could not reach a conclusion on details of the incident but confirmed that one of the two passengers on the helicopter was a senior commander linked to General Athor. The case was referred to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, which in turn referred it to the Ceasefire Political Commission for further deliberations.

23. On 25 July, forces commanded by David Yau-Yau, a former civil servant in southern Jonglei State, attacked an SPLA unit near Pibor, killing two and wounding nine persons. Yau-Yau's forces have launched several attacks on military and civilian targets since that time. On 8 August, an armed group supporting Colonel Gatluak Gai, formerly of SPLA, ambushed a convoy in Unity State, killing 17 SPLA troops and 6 civilians.

24. In July, SPLA forcibly disarmed Shilluk youth in Fashoda County following reports of an armed attack on SPLA forces that had left 11 SPLA soldiers dead. The disarmament campaign in July resulted in 4 Shilluk youth dead and 11 detained, who remain in SPLA custody to date, as well as reports of the SPLA looting houses and livestock. Following a ceasefire agreed on 15 August between the SPLA and Shilluk forces under the command of Colonel Robert Guan, a Shilluk-Shilluk dialogue was held in Fashoda under the auspices of the Shilluk King from 25 to 27 August. The situation in Fashoda area has remained calm since then.

25. Civilian disarmament campaigns carried out by SPLA also prompted the displacement of civilians in other parts of Southern Sudan, such as Lakes and Warab States, during the reporting period.

26. Reports of attacks by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) against villages along the southern border of the Sudan continued. On 4 September, LRA reportedly attacked Bodo and Nahua villages in Western Equatoria, killing eight and abducting two children, one of whom later escaped. A local militia unit pursued the attackers towards the Congolese border.

27. With the onset of the rains there has been a general decrease in inter-tribal violence, particularly cattle raids and conflicts over water and grazing areas. However, inter-communal tensions have remained high in some areas, fuelling several attacks. A major cattle-raiding incident involving local communities in Yirol East County and Yirol West County in Lakes State on 4 August left 30 dead. Conflicting Dinka and Shilluk land claims in Upper Nile State also remain a significant concern.

28. In what appears to be a concerted effort to promote stability in advance of the referendum, governors in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Lakes and Northern Bahr El Ghazal States have convened inter-tribal peace conferences to mediate local disputes. UNMIS is working closely with United Nations agencies and Sudanese authorities to support these efforts. UNMIS has consulted newly elected State governors and County commissioners to further develop its conflict management and mitigation strategy. UNMIS, in collaboration with UNDP and the International Organization for Migration, continues to facilitate and support political party round tables in all

10 southern States with the view to providing a platform for an inter-party dialogue that will contribute to reducing tensions and creating a conducive atmosphere for peaceful political processes, particularly the referendum.

29. The security situation in Abyei continues to be volatile. While the Misseriya completed their northward migration without any major associated incidents, there are concerns about the potential for security incidents during their southward migration, which will commence in October and continue for the next few months.

Redeployment of forces

30. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have redeployed all their forces from southern Sudan, while monitored and verified SPLA redeployment remains at 34.8 percent of a stated strength of 59,168. On 25 January 2010, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties accepted these figures in the 111th meeting of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. SPLA forces have allowed joint monitoring teams to complete monitoring and verification of redeployment near White Lake Jaw, but continue to block monitoring and verification in Duar in Upper Nile State.

Joint Integrated Units

31. The strength of the Joint Integrated Units, which has remained unchanged since April 2009, is 32,900 (approximately 83 per cent of its mandated strength of 39,639). The re-verification process, initially scheduled for completion by 15 November 2009, is ongoing. The security working group, established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties to negotiate post-referendum arrangements, has agreed to place discussions on unity and secession options for the post-referendum status of the Joint Integrated Unit as the first item on its agenda.

UNMIS military deployment

32. As at 15 September 2010, the UNMIS military component had deployed 9,948 of its authorized 10,000 military personnel, including 483 military observers, 190 staff officers and 9,275 troops. This brings the force to 99.57 per cent of the strength recommended (9,990) in the 2008 military capability study.

33. On 3 September, the Government of India informed the United Nations of its decision not to renew the contract for the deployment of six military utility helicopters (Mi-17) to UNMIS beyond 31 October. The Indian Aviation Unit represents one third of the military utility helicopter capability in UNMIS. UNMIS has developed a plan to mitigate the short-term impact following the loss of those helicopters and is planning to replace that capability with commercial aircraft. The procurement process is already under way, with a view to deploying these assets by the end of October.

Restrictions on freedom of movement

34. The freedom of movement for UNMIS continued to be problematic during the reporting period. SAF continued to deny UNMIS military access to Higlig and Karasana (Southern Kordofan State). SPLA denied UNMIS access to the Kodok area (Upper Nile State) from 22 July to 11 August.

35. Security incidents related to restrictions on UNMIS movement in southern Sudan continued during the reporting period. UNMIS helicopters were detained by

SPLA on two separate occasions. On 22 July, approximately 150 SPLA soldiers detained an UNMIS long-range patrol at gunpoint near Kodok, manhandling members of the patrol and threatening violence unless the patrol withdrew. When an UNMIS helicopter arrived to help evacuate the patrol, SPLA soldiers detained and physically assaulted its crew before allowing the helicopter to leave. On 4 August, an UNMIS helicopter dispatched from Wau to survey a referendum site in Tonj was held by SPLA at the Tonji airstrip. The aircraft and all on board were released six hours later.

36. UNMIS and the Government of Southern Sudan have agreed on the establishment of joint UNMIS-SPLA security committees at the regional, State and county levels to facilitate information flow, build confidence and ensure access for UNMIS operations in support of the upcoming referendum.

UNMIS police

37. The police component of the Mission currently comprises 634 advisers, out of an authorized strength of 715. During the reporting period, the UNMIS police component focused on training the southern Sudanese Police Service in referendum security and assisting it in preparing its referendum security plans. So far, a total of 9,663 southern Sudanese Police Service officers have been trained in referendum security.

38. UNMIS police officers are now co-located with southern Sudan police commissioners in each of the 10 States to support the southern Sudanese Police Service. UNMIS will also participate in the State referendum security committees, which are comprised of local Sudanese security agencies, once they are established. UNMIS currently co-chairs the High Security Referendum Committee established by the Government of Southern Sudan on 1 September.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

39. As at 1 September, the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had demobilized 19,830 ex-combatants in northern Sudan and 6,055 in Southern Sudan, including 6,258 women. A demobilization exercise in Rumbek was completed in July 2010, with a total of 3,675 demobilized ex-combatants. Subsequent operations were launched in Kauda and Aweil, which resulted in the demobilization of a further 2,283 ex-combatants, including 571 women.

40. Some 8,490 ex-combatants have received reintegration support by UNDP and its implementing partners in northern Sudan. The provision of reintegration services for the majority of the remaining ex-combatants is expected to commence in late September/early October 2010. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme currently requires an additional \$8 million in extrabudgetary funds to complete the planned reintegration of 17,940 northern ex-combatants by the end of October 2010. Unless outstanding pledges are fulfilled, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme will lack sufficient funding for its activities in northern Sudan in 2011.

41. In Southern Sudan, 5,941 ex-combatants are receiving reintegration services. UNDP and its implementing partners have made arrangements to provide reintegration services to an additional 7,219 ex-combatants, once demobilized.

42. As part of the efforts to strengthen the capacity of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Commission in Juba, UNMIS constructed and

handed over 6 of the 10 planned State offices to the Southern Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Commission. UNDP also supported renovations of the Commission headquarters in Juba.

Mine action

43. The United Nations has cleared 2,721,746 square metres of land, destroyed 1,483 anti-personnel mines, 413 anti-tank mines, 38,251 small arms and ammunition and 11,316 items of unexploded ordnance in the Sudan. In addition, the United Nations cleared 1,286 kilometres of road and provided mine-risk education to 42,122 affected people. Land release operations facilitated freedom of movement for the local population, delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of IDPs.

VI. Protection of civilians

44. UNMIS continued to receive reports of serious abuses carried out by SPLA during its military operations and civilian disarmament campaigns. The Mission has raised the issue of the negative impact of forced disarmament with the relevant Government authorities, which has led to its temporary suspension. Despite reports indicating the existence of armed groups along the border of Western Bahr El Ghazal State and Southern Darfur, UNMIS was unable to conduct an assessment of these areas owing to the lack of security guarantees from SPLA. Planned aerial assessments of the border areas of Al Fifi, Elaguz, Firka, Malaga and Bua in Western Bahr El Ghazal State were also called off after security clearances from SPLA were denied.

45. The Mission has now finalized, in consultation with the United Nations country team, a strategy for the protection of civilians intended to provide clear direction on how it will meet the objectives of its protection of civilian mandate during the last year of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The strategy articulates the vision of the Mission, and outlines the platforms for coordination between the various mission components responsible for the implementation of the strategy.

Child protection

46. The implementation of the United Nations/SPLA action plan on the release of children associated with SPLA is advancing in Southern Sudan, although the reintegration of demobilized children remains a pressing challenge. On 30 August 2010, SPLA established a Child Protection Unit in Bilpham, Central Equatoria State, in support of the implementation of the United Nations/SPLA action plan.

47. On 16 July 2010, the first 49 children were registered and removed from the SPLA Mapel barracks in Western Bahr El Ghazal State. After undergoing rehabilitation and counselling provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare, these children were reunified with their families.

V. Humanitarian situation, recovery and return

Humanitarian developments

48. Insecurity, inter-tribal violence and seasonal flooding have had a serious humanitarian impact in southern Sudan during the reporting period. Since the beginning of the year, approximately 230,000 people have either been displaced by

conflicts or affected by floods, and are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. In addition, the livelihoods of some 60,000 people have been affected.

49. Food security remains precarious, with estimates that nearly half of the population of Southern Sudan will have received food assistance at some point during 2010. The prolonged "hunger gap" has contributed to a sharp rise in malnutrition. More than 50,000 children have been affected by acute malnutrition, with assessments indicating malnutrition rates that are well above emergency thresholds of the World Health Organization in 5 of the 10 states in the south. In a positive development, the timely onset of rains has increased the prospect of favourable harvests.

50. Humanitarian agencies have reported a sharp increase in the denial of humanitarian access in 2010. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat has received more than 80 verified reports of interference with humanitarian activities since January 2010.

51. In an encouraging sign, the Government of Southern Sudan has created a new Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. This new Ministry will provide a higher profile for humanitarian coordination and advocacy within the Government of Southern Sudan.

52. Humanitarian operations continue to face funding constraints. Donors have provided, so far, only 56 per cent of the \$1,843,386,608 requested in the revised humanitarian work plan for operations in the Sudan.

Recovery and development

53. The United Nations has begun planning for a technical meeting on capacity development in southern Sudan in order to coordinate its approach. UNDP and the World Bank will work together to support the Government of Southern Sudan in formulating a framework that will foster a unified approach to providing international support to capacity development efforts of the Government of Southern Sudan.

54. The Government of Southern Sudan has announced an upcoming programme entitled "Accelerated return and early reintegration initiative (ARERI)", aimed at encouraging former residents of the southern States and their descendants residing in the north to return to the south. Also, the Abyei Area Administration has conducted an initial registration of people of Dinka Ngok origin, residing in the north, which produced a caseload of 35,000 individuals potentially interested in return to the Abyei area. The Government of Southern Sudan has indicated that it will fund \$10 million of the \$24 million needed for the programme. The funding of the remaining \$14 million is still under consideration. The United Nations country team is prepared to support the process, provided that conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns can be guaranteed.

55. In mid-August, the Government of Southern Sudan endorsed the UNDP regional initiative for capacity enhancement. Under this programme, 200 civil servants from member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will be deployed in strategic functions within Government of Southern Sudan institutions to strengthen governance infrastructure and support the delivery of essential public services. The IGAD civil servants will be embedded in ministries and twinned with Southern Sudanese officials to ensure the transfer of skills and

capacity development over the medium term. UNDP also supported training for the Southern Sudan State Assemblies, using specialists from neighbouring countries and focusing on ethics, parliamentary conduct, finance and budgeting, rules of procedure and relations with the executive branch. Similar programmes are now ongoing for county commissioners and local government directors.

56. The Sudan Recovery Fund, a funding instrument directed at filling gaps in medium-term assistance, continues to provide support for stabilization activities in the south. In addition to the construction of roads, water points and police stations in conflict-affected areas in Jonglei and Lakes States, new projects are being elaborated by the State Security Committees in Eastern Equatoria and Warab States.

57. Consultations between the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations and donors led to an expansion of development activities in eight prioritized areas of Southern Kordofan State. The United Nations country team is currently engaged in a dialogue to review the action plan, including 168 projects, and to further institutionalize development planning, including community-based approaches as the reconciliation and peaceful co-existence mechanism and UNDP-led conflict reduction programming.

Return and reintegration

58. Despite heavy flooding in some areas, returns continued by river and along accessible overland routes. Mid-year figures compiled during July revealed that more than 100,000 former IDPs and refugees had returned home during the first half of 2010. In a break with historical trends, however, return numbers have dropped to relatively low levels, even for the rainy season, compared with figures for this quarter during previous years.

59. The core functions of the Government of Southern Sudan that require international support until the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement interim period and beyond, irrespective of the outcome of the referendums, have been identified jointly by UNMIS and the United Nations country team, together with the Government of Southern Sudan. These include (a) executive leadership; (b) security sector reform; (c) rule of law and law enforcement; (d) fiduciary management; (e) public administration; and (f) management of natural resources. On 17 September, a high-level meeting, which was facilitated by the United Nations, was convened in Brussels to mobilize support for building the capacity of these core functions. The participants, who included key donors, endorsed the capacity-building framework and action plan of the Government of Southern Sudan.

VI. Governance and human rights

Rule of law

60. UNMIS rule of law activities during the reporting period focused on strengthening core rule of law institutions in both northern and Southern Sudan. The Mission held a number of consultative meetings with the newly elected members of the National Assembly and provided advisory support, training and analysis to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. UNMIS also continued its assessment of prisons, as well as capacity-building and rehabilitation activities for prisons in the north.

61. With the launch of the Justice and Security Sectors Advisory and Coordination Cell, UNMIS has scaled up its support for security sector reform efforts in the south. The Cell coordinates the United Nations and donor support for the Government of Southern Sudan in an effort to ensure that referendum and post-referendum security measures lay the foundation for longer term justice and security sector development.

62. UNMIS is also providing logistics support to State governments' efforts to convene the first County Commissioners' Forum in all 10 States. The objective of the Forum is to discuss and make proposals to address administrative issues at the county level on the basis of the 2009 Local Government Act.

Human rights

63. Significant concerns regarding restrictions on freedom of expression remain. While pre-publication press censorship involving routine visits by the National Intelligence and Security Service, which was reintroduced for the April elections, was reportedly lifted on 8 August, the Service reportedly distributed to editors a long list of topics prohibited for publication, including the International Criminal Court, IDPs in Darfur, pro-secessionist rhetoric and the prosecution of journalists. In early August, the Service also issued forms requesting journalists to submit personal information, including on their political affiliation, tribe, family and intimate friends. Journalists who refused to fill out the form were intimidated and threatened by Service agents. Meanwhile, three newspapers remain closed by authorities of the Government of the Sudan for publishing content deemed controversial, and seven criminal cases remain pending against the SPLM-aligned newspaper *Ajrass al-Hurriya* for the publication of contentious articles.

64. Nearly 15 months after the National Assembly enacted enabling legislation, the parties have made no progress on establishing the national human rights commission. A fully operational national human rights commission is critical to the promotion and protection of human rights in the Sudan, particularly in the context of the democratic transformation envisioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and in the run up to the referendum.

VII. Cross-cutting issues

Integrated United Nations planning

65. Integrated planning to guide the United Nations engagement and operations in support of mandate implementation before and after the referendum period was completed in July, and both UNMIS and the United Nations country team established structures to coordinate the identified priorities.

66. Contingency planning for the United Nations support to the post-referendum transitional period (January to June 2011) has also started. The Mission and the United Nations country team will continue their efforts to sustain United Nations support to maintaining overall security in the Mission area, conflict management and the protection of civilians, and to developing governance and rule of law capacities in Southern Sudan. They will also assist the parties, upon their request, in the transition from existing Comprehensive Peace Agreement border security and ceasefire monitoring arrangements, to the new post-Comprehensive Peace

Agreement configuration that will have been agreed upon in the context of the post-referendum negotiations.

Public information

67. During the reporting period, UNMIS continued its extensive support to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with special focus on the Southern Sudan referendum process. The Mission organized a round table in Juba on the role of the media in the lead-up to the referendum, bringing together senior editors from leading media houses based in northern and Southern Sudan. It also conducted a two-day workshop in Gedaref State on the theme "The role of the media in reinforcing popular consultations".

68. Radio Miraya continued to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through daily broadcasts, audience response shows, debates and programmes. The national Government has not yet assigned an FM frequency to maximize its coverage in northern Sudan.

Conduct and discipline

69. UNMIS conducted training and awareness-raising workshops throughout the Mission area and continued to monitor potential risk factors for misconduct during the reporting period.

70. The Mission also continued to monitor compliance of staff members with the United Nations Code of Conduct and its zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. The Mission also targeted communities in southern Sudan to build awareness regarding the zero-tolerance policy.

Gender

71. On 10 June, UNMIS hosted an "open day" on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in Khartoum for women's groups and United Nations agencies in commemoration of the 10-year anniversary of the adoption of the resolution. The event was preceded by preparatory consultations with women peace groups across the Sudan, including in Juba, Warrap, Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria States and Darfur.

72. UNMIS has trained 88 members of State Assemblies on gender mainstreaming. The Mission is also providing technical support to build the capacity of the community police units within the national police forces.

HIV/AIDS

73. The Mission continued efforts to support the integration of HIV/AIDS awareness in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. It also conducted awareness-raising and capacity-building campaigns, and provided voluntary confidential counselling and testing services in Juba, Central Equatoria State and Malakal, Upper Nile State.

Staff security

74. Criminality and banditry, as well as forced detentions, continued to pose a security threat to United Nations personnel. Reported incidents during the quarter

included 12 incidents of arrest/detention and harassment of United Nations staff; four cases of physical assaults resulting in injuries; 14 incidents of theft, burglary and trespassing against United Nations staff and compounds; and the detention and physical assault of United Nations helicopter crew members.

Coordination with other peacekeeping missions

75. During the reporting period, the Military Information Cell continued its regular exchange of reports with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and UNAMID, as well as interaction during inter-mission conferences. UNMIS and MONUSCO are cooperating closely to maintain situational awareness of operations of Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo-Uganda People's Defence Forces against LRA. UNMIS continues to exchange flash reports and other vital information with UNAMID regarding flight restrictions of the Government of the Sudan over Southern Darfur and JEM/SAF clashes.

Financial aspects

76. The General Assembly, by its resolution 64/283 of 24 June 2010, appropriated for the maintenance of UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 an amount of \$938 million. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2011, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2011 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

77. The amount appropriated for the maintenance of UNMIS does not include costs related to UNMIS technical, logistical and security assistance for the upcoming referendums in southern Sudan and the Abyei Area. The estimated cost of UNMIS assistance comprises some \$81.5 million, for an eight-month period. The projection is based on the deployment of an additional 506 temporary staff and additional operational costs, and takes into account the existing assets of UNMIS.

78. In addition, the panel appointed by the Secretary-General on the referendums in the Sudan has been established to monitor the referendums for a six-month period. The financial implication to the Organization is estimated at \$4.3 million, with the expectation that UNDP would contribute \$0.9 million of the cost. The cost of the panel entails 41 temporary staff and associated operational resources.

79. As at 30 June 2010, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to \$122.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,363.5 million.

80. The reimbursement of troop-contributing governments for troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 May 2010 and 31 March 2010, respectively.

VIII. Observations and recommendations

81. I am encouraged by reassurances from both parties regarding their commitment to the continued implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including holding the referendums within the stipulated timeline. This peace process is unique in the history of the Sudan and the next few months will be

critical for safeguarding the achievements made since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

82. As the Comprehensive Peace Agreement deadline for the referendums approaches, public anticipation and anxiety are building up at an accelerated pace. The events of the next three months will have a profound impact on the future of the Sudan. The stakes are undeniably high, as failure to meet the deadline for the referendums prescribed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement could have severe consequences. Notwithstanding the progress made so far, it is imperative that the parties to the Agreement and all relevant authorities redouble their efforts to ensure that they successfully meet the deadline.

83. The United Nations is doing all it can, with key partners, to facilitate the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including the timely and credible conduct of the referendums. The African Union and the United Nations convened the first meeting of the Sudan Consultative Forum in Khartoum on 17 July, bringing together IGAD, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, the neighbouring States and other bilateral partners. The Forum stressed the need for cooperation between NCP and SPLM and for international support to the referendum processes.

84. On 24 September, I hosted a high-level meeting on the Sudan in the margins of the General Assembly to discuss key issues related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Darfur peace process, capacity development in southern Sudan and the eastern Sudan peace process. The meeting was attended by 12 Heads of States, including President Barack Obama of the United States of America, President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi (Chair of the African Union) and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia (Chair of IGAD), as well as Chairperson Ping of the African Union Commission and the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Sudanese Vice-President Taha and First Vice-President Kiir participated also. The meeting adopted a final communiqué in which the Sudanese parties recommitted themselves to overcoming all challenges necessary to hold the referendums on 9 January 2011. The communiqué also highlighted the strong international support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement processes and the urgent need for the parties to resolve key post-referendum arrangements in order to ensure a smooth transition through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement period. On Darfur, the participants expressed support for the Doha peace process, while taking note with concern of the serious security situation in Darfur.

85. The international partners of the Sudan are eager and ready to support and assist the Sudanese people through this last phase of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and beyond. However, it is, and must continue to be, a fundamentally Sudanese effort. International contributions have been important and will continue to be so long after the referendums, but only the political will of the Sudanese themselves can drive this process forward. As such, it is the parties to the Agreement that have the primary responsibility to ensure its success.

86. Under these conditions, a productive working relationship and a commitment by the parties to work together in good faith are absolute prerequisites for success. There is simply no time remaining for political confrontation and stalemates. Bearing in mind their obligation to the Sudanese people, I call upon the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties to rise to the occasion and take advantage of this opportunity to demonstrate real leadership by finding solutions that address all of the legitimate concerns at stake.

87. Nowhere is the need for good faith cooperation more evident than in the southern Sudan referendum preparations. Referendum preparations are well behind schedule, and the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission must move extremely quickly if it is to fulfil its mandate in the time remaining. Any further delays will have a major impact upon the technical and logistical realities of preparing for and conducting the referendum on time. A fully operational Commission is essential for effective and timely assistance by the international community. I call upon the parties to do everything necessary to address any obstacles that have the potential to interfere with the Commission's ability to shoulder its responsibilities effectively.

88. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Abyei. Preparations for the Abyei referendum are even further behind schedule, and the continued lack of progress is exacerbating an already tense and volatile situation on the ground. The disputes and concerns holding up the preparations can be addressed effectively only through a comprehensive package including wealth-sharing, access to water and grazing land, residence and property ownership, and border demarcation. I call upon the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties to make immediate progress on these interrelated issues, recognize the urgent need to establish the Abyei Referendum Commission, address the concerns of the local communities, and uphold their obligations under the Agreement to conduct a timely and credible referendum in Abyei.

89. I commend the parties on launching their negotiations on post-referendum arrangements, and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for its leadership in supporting and facilitating the process. Rapid progress in these discussions would prove enormously helpful, both in addressing the legitimate concerns about the future relationship of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties and in creating an environment conducive to moving forward on other key issues. I urge the parties to accelerate their efforts to build momentum in these talks and show tangible progress. Moreover, while the United Nations and its international partners fully respect the desire of the parties to address these issues bilaterally, I urge the parties to take full advantage of every resource available to them, whether domestic or international.

90. The referendums in the Sudan must be free, fair and credible, and their outcome must reflect the true choice of the people. I appointed a three-member panel to monitor the referendums, at the request of the parties, to assist Sudanese authorities to ensure the credibility of the process. At the same time, it is incumbent upon the parties to do everything possible to deliver referendum processes that are models of transparency and to lead a substantive political debate that provides the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei with the genuine opportunity to weigh their options. I urge the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties and the international community to extend their fullest cooperation to the independent panel I established at the request of the parties.

91. The popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States are critical milestones not only in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but also in the Sudan's continuing democratic transformation. It is thus vital to ensure that they remain a priority even as political attention remains more

focused on the referendums. I note with concern that shifting schedules may complicate the process, particularly in Southern Kordofan State. I urge the parties to ensure that the popular consultations receive appropriate attention and resources, and that the census results for Southern Kordofan are released as soon as is practical.

92. The continued escalation of restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMIS since my last report represents a serious challenge to the implementation of the Mission and its support to the upcoming referendums. The detention and physical assault of any United Nations personnel is entirely unacceptable. I call upon the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties to take appropriate measures to ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel and facilitate the unhindered implementation of the mandate of the Mission in this critical period.

93. I am concerned about continued delays in border demarcation. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties have a great deal of work still to do not only on demarcating the border, but also in addressing the concerns of border communities and determining how they will manage the border region. All of these issues are essentially political in nature, and require political solutions. I urge the parties to act quickly in answering those political questions that continue to prevent the relevant technical bodies from completing their assigned tasks, to engage in a dialogue with the border communities, and to seek agreements and solutions that provide the least disruption to their lives.

94. Despite recent progress, logistical, political and security constraints will render the planned demobilization and reintegration of 180,000 ex-combatants by the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement period extremely difficult. Moreover, the possibility of a significant shortfall in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration funding for the north is a serious concern, particularly as the referendums are likely to overshadow near-term fund-raising efforts. I therefore call on donors to ensure that assistance to demobilized ex-combatants continues and that reintegration activities proceed without disruption. I urge donors to examine options for supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts of the Sudan in the post-referendum period.

95. Despite efforts by humanitarian agencies on the ground, the overall relief effort remains seriously hampered by continued funding shortfalls and a shortage of humanitarian partners to deliver supplies across six emergency pipelines: food, nutrition, non-food items and emergency shelter, emergency medical kits, seeds and tools, and water and sanitation. An increase in donor assistance is urgently required in order to guard against a serious deterioration in humanitarian conditions during the referendum period and beyond. I, therefore, urge donors to generously contribute to efforts to alleviate any humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan during the critical months ahead.

96. The next quarter will be critical for the future of the Sudan and the entire region. The challenges of these three months will be daunting, but no more so than those ahead in 2011 and beyond. It is incumbent upon the international community to do everything within its power to assist the Sudanese in meeting these challenges. We must move very quickly now, but also recognize our long-term commitments in the Sudan. I call upon the international community to mobilize all available resources to contribute coordinated efforts to support the people of the Sudan in the days, weeks and months ahead.

97. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation for the dedicated service of my Special Representative for the Sudan, Haile Menkerios, as well as for all military, police and civilian staff serving in UNMIS.

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1923 (2010) of 25 May 2010, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) until 31 December 2010. The report covers developments since my previous report on MINURCAT, dated 30 July 2010 (S/2010/409), concerning the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic; progress towards the fulfilment of the tasks and benchmarks set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 1923 (2010); and the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, including preparations for its withdrawal.

II. Security

2. During the reporting period, the overall security situation was relatively quiet. The number of reported incidents relating to the safety and security of United Nations and humanitarian personnel decreased significantly in comparison to the previous reporting period, with the exception of cases of theft or attempted theft. A total of 10 incidents were reported in August and September compared with 21 incidents in June and July. There were no reported cases of carjacking attempts or armed robbery. This decrease is attributed, inter alia, to: the unusually heavy rainy season, which limited overland movement; greater vigilance by the Chadian authorities and security forces; and improved relations between Chad and the Sudan including, in particular, the activities of the Chadian-Sudanese Joint Border Monitoring Force. During the reporting period, more than 300 members of Chadian armed opposition groups returned from the Sudan to Chad.

3. On 17 September, an operation conducted by the Joint Border Monitoring Force safely recovered an expatriate commercial contractor who had been kidnapped 10 days earlier in the area of Am Djarass (Ennedi region) in eastern Chad. The contractor was recovered in West Darfur. Six suspects were arrested by the Chadian authorities. On 20 September, the Sudanese Ambassador to Chad announced that the two countries had agreed to increase the strength of the Joint Border Monitoring Force from 3,000 to 4,000 troops.



III. Humanitarian situation

4. During the reporting period, the humanitarian needs in eastern Chad were exacerbated by food shortages and flooding. Some 262,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps, 68,000 refugees from the Central African Republic and 168,000 internally displaced persons at 38 sites received assistance from humanitarian organizations. In addition, assistance was provided to 48,000 returnees and an estimated 150,000 members of the host population.

5. Unusually heavy rains caused flooding and destroyed property. Assessing the full impact of the floods has been difficult. Many areas remain inaccessible either by land or air. An estimated 144,000 people throughout the country have been seriously affected, and 15 people died as a result of the floods. In the Dar Sila region, some 104 internally displaced families whose homes had been destroyed by the floods were relocated to safer areas by the Government or by humanitarian organizations. At least one major international non-governmental organization has reprogrammed its activities from the east to other areas of the country to address emerging humanitarian challenges.

IV. Responsibility of the Government of Chad for the protection of civilians and of United Nations and humanitarian organization personnel and assets

A. Security and protection of civilians in danger

6. The strength of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) currently stands at 804 officers, including 90 women. In August and until 23 September, the national authorities reported that DIS conducted 2,329 day and night patrols in and around refugee camps and provided 1,316 security escorts for humanitarian actors. In addition, DIS provided protection at 150 food distribution points run by humanitarian actors. DIS also recorded 197 infractions of the law and the arrest of 92 suspects, 33 of whom were transferred to the local gendarmerie for referral to the justice system.

7. On 7 September, the Government of Chad submitted its plan for the sustainment of DIS (S/2010/470). In that plan, the Government reiterated its commitment to assuming full responsibility for the sustainment of DIS both logistically and materially, and to reinforce the personnel and equipment of DIS. In the plan, it is also suggested that sustained donor support is required. The concept for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad provides for a security belt, consisting of three elements: Chadian National Army troops, based in garrison towns along the entire border with the Sudan, complemented by the Chadian-Sudanese Joint Border Monitoring Force; the Gendarmerie nationale and the Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad, located in all major villages in the east; and, DIS, located within and around refugee camps and towns, in conjunction with local security forces such as the gendarmerie and the national police.

8. The Government is planning to approach a number of potential donors and other international partners to help meet the budgetary requirements for 2011 to financially sustain DIS. The budget proposal is for a strength of 1,000 officers at an

estimated cost of US\$ 13.8 million (\$7.6 million for operating costs and \$6.2 million for personnel costs). The Government is reviewing this cost estimate, however.

B. Facilitation of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel

9. By mid-September, the Government had established Bureaux de sécurisation et des mouvements, with support from the Mission, in 9 of 13 planned locations. Operationally, the bureaux concentrated primarily on coordinating security escorts for humanitarian personnel. Less attention was devoted to other functions, such as information sharing, guard duties, area security patrols and quick reaction to incidents. The Government continues to address logistical, communications and administrative challenges to the bureaux, with support from MINURCAT. The performance of the bureaux can only be fully tested after the onset of the dry season, when movement and humanitarian activities can fully resume.

V. Progress by the Government of Chad towards benchmarks established by the Security Council

A. Voluntary return of internally displaced persons in secure and sustainable conditions

10. On 7 September, the Joint Government of Chad/United Nations High-level Working Group held its third meeting to assess the situation on the ground with respect to the protection of civilians and the implementation of measures adopted by the Government towards implementing the tasks set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1923 (2010). During the meeting, the representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that some 48,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their villages of origin (17,000 in Assoungba and 18,000 in Koko (Ouaddaï region); 10,000 in and around Kerfi and 3,000 in Moudeina (Dar Sila region)). The Coordination nationale d'appui au déploiement de la force internationale à l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT) reported that, in anticipation of further returns of internally displaced persons, the Government had deployed gendarmes to the areas of return to provide security and that public services would be restored. Both Government and United Nations representatives highlighted the importance of ensuring the voluntary nature of returns of the internally displaced and the necessity of addressing basic needs, such as security, education, food, shelter and medical services in the areas of return to ensure returns are sustainable.

11. At the meeting's conclusion, members of the Task Force expressed their satisfaction with the relatively calm security situation prevailing in eastern Chad in July and August. The Head of CONAFIT and Chairman of the High-level Working Group, General Oki Mahamat Yaya Dagache, citing the increased vigilance of Chadian local authorities, stressed that the current level of security should be maintained.

B. Demilitarization of refugee camps

12. During the reporting period, the Government of Chad and UNHCR continued to conduct programmes to sensitize refugees and displaced persons to the civilian character of camps. On 12 September, in the Goz Amer refugee camp near Goz Beida (Dar Sila region), DIS arrested 11 people suspected of having conducted recruitment activities in the camp for an armed group over the past few months. Five of them remain in custody after investigations and have been referred to the justice system.

C. Security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect to international human rights standards

13. The Government of Chad made efforts, through the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties, to establish structures to implement recommendations made by international human rights mechanisms, including treaty bodies and the universal periodic review. Despite their limited capacity, the regional delegations of the Ministry, with the technical and logistical support of MINURCAT, have actively engaged in human rights sensitization of the local authorities and law enforcement officials. At the request of the Chadian military and security authorities, MINURCAT conducted training and sensitization for the national security forces on their role in protecting human rights.

VI. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

A. Support to the D  tachement int  gr   de s  curit  

14. MINURCAT continued to consolidate DIS, with a particular focus on increasing its administrative and operational autonomy. With the closure in July of the Mission's offices in Baha   and Gu  r  da, full-time monitoring and support of those DIS posts ceased. So far, the security situation in those locations has been characterized as calm. Security functions continue to be carried out by DIS.

15. A selection process for 200 new DIS recruits is under way and CONAFIT provided MINURCAT with a list of 293 candidates, including 47 women. Training of the new recruits is scheduled to be completed in the coming months and will bring the strength of DIS up to approximately 1,000 officers.

16. MINURCAT conducted a series of training sessions for 22 senior DIS officers on monitoring and mentoring, performance evaluation, investigation, and community policing techniques and practices. Tuition was also provided on radio communications and vehicle repairs. Several workshops were also conducted to enhance the planning and instructional techniques of DIS trainers. On 24 August, the Mission completed the training of an additional 19 DIS trainers, bringing the total number to 30. Those officers are expected to assume the functions of the United Nations Police for the initial and on-the-job training of DIS officers.

17. Current planning provides for the transfer of training competencies and administrative tasks from MINURCAT to DIS by the end of October 2010. MINURCAT is also assisting DIS to establish a reference library that will include educational support materials for the future training of DIS personnel.

18. To date, the MINURCAT-administered trust fund for rule of law activities in eastern Chad has received \$8.1 million for DIS, of the \$17.3 million needed for 2010. An additional disbursement of donor pledges of approximately \$2.6 million is awaited. This leaves a shortfall of approximately \$6.6 million. In view of this shortfall, MINURCAT, until the end of its mandate, will endeavour to cover only the basic needs of DIS.

B. Rule of law

19. On 12 August, the national justice programme, Programme d'appui à la justice, supported by the European Union, MINURCAT and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched a competitive process to contract a non-governmental organization(s) to establish and operate three legal aid clinics in eastern Chad. Under the proposal, the selected non-governmental organization(s) will be in charge of operating the clinics, as well as arranging training for legal aid providers and humanitarian protection officers. The Government of Germany has committed funds for this purpose.

20. MINURCAT has continued to provide technical support and mentoring to the 158 non-professional justices of the peace and their assistants. UNDP and MINURCAT also conducted a joint assessment mission within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Abéché to evaluate the impact of the training of non-professional justices of the peace and to identify ways to further strengthen the capacity of the judiciary at the community level. The outcome of the assessment is being finalized. On 25 August, in cooperation with UNDP and UNHCR, MINURCAT organized a workshop for the judicial actors and justice auxiliaries of Abéché on the coordination of the technical support, improving the circuit court system, and the delivery of legal aid.

21. The Mission also continued to provide training and mentoring to national prison officials on international standards of prison management and administration, as well as on prison development. Since 11 August, MINURCAT advisers have been co-located with national counterparts in the Prisons Directorate in N'Djamena to help enhance its human resources management, planning and budgetary capacities. In late September, MINURCAT completed the refurbishment of the Iriba prison, which improved both the conditions of detention of the inmates and the security of the prison.

22. Considerable attention needs to be given to improving living conditions in prisons in Chad and major challenges remain. Basic service deficiencies, such as in the provision of food and water, as well as insufficient numbers of trained prison guards, continue to account for prison disturbances and escapes. Detention facilities remain seriously overcrowded, largely owing to the number of persons in pretrial detention. Action on two draft laws on the establishment of a professionalized prison service, in accordance with internationally accepted standards, remains pending since 2009.

C. Human rights

23. During recent field visits to refugee camps, sites for the internally displaced and nearby villages, MINURCAT registered fewer reports of human rights abuses. Sexual and gender-based violence and arbitrary detention remained the main human rights concerns. In the past two months, human rights officers documented 53 such cases, compared to 67 in the previous four months.

24. MINURCAT human rights training programmes focused on national and international human rights standards and the responsibilities of law enforcement officials with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights. Training was provided to officers of the national security forces (50 in Adré and 42 in Abéché). The latter training was a joint initiative of the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties, UNDP and MINURCAT. Two workshops were held in September on the development of the Ministry's draft national action plan for human rights.

25. On 10 August, in Goz Beida, the Mission facilitated a sensitization session on human rights protection for 23 focal points of national and international non-governmental organizations working at sites for the internally displaced in the Dar Sila region. The session was part of a programme organized by UNHCR, in collaboration with the non-governmental organization INTEKSOS. A public awareness campaign on sexual and gender-based violence and children's rights was also conducted from 11 to 19 August at the sites for the internally displaced in the Dar Sila region.

26. Quick impact projects were undertaken to strengthen the operational capacity of national counterparts to conduct human rights monitoring. Human rights materials were also donated to the umbrella organization Collectif des associations de défense des droits de l'homme to support the sensitization programmes of its members.

27. In preparation for the assumption of human rights responsibilities by national counterparts, MINURCAT, together with regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties and local human rights organizations, conducted 35 field visits during the reporting period to refugee camps, camps for internally displaced persons, towns and villages, and 16 monitoring visits to detention facilities in eastern Chad. The joint visits provided an opportunity to build up the practical knowledge of national counterparts, introduce them to monitoring tools and mentor them on advocacy.

28. From 26 July to 2 August, representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) undertook an assessment mission to evaluate the prevailing human rights situation and the capacity of national counterparts to meet international human rights obligations applicable to Chad. The mission noted the Government's commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights at the national and local levels. The Government acknowledged the current limited capacities of national human rights institutions, including the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties and its regional delegations, as well as the National Human Rights Commission, and expressed its readiness to engage with OHCHR in that regard.

D. Child protection

29. During the rainy season, reports of child recruitment by armed forces or groups in eastern Chad decreased. In August, pursuant to an agreement between the Government and the Chadian armed opposition group Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT) concluded earlier in 2010, 58 children, including 10 girls, were reunited with their families.

30. On 2 and 3 August, experts from the signatory States of the June 2010 N'Djamena Declaration met in the capital to initiate a plan of action for the Declaration's implementation. In the Declaration, the signatories States had committed themselves to putting an end to the recruitment and use of children by armed groups and forces. MINURCAT, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR and other United Nations agencies provided technical assistance to the meeting.

E. Gender

31. MINURCAT, in coordination with UNDP, organized a workshop in Abéché on 27 and 28 July to finalize a training module on gender for service providers in the judicial and security sectors. From 16 to 18 September, the Ministry of Social Action, with support from the Mission, organized a forum on the involvement of women in conflict resolution, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, and the celebration of the African Week of Peace. The participants in the forum commenced a process of identifying elements for a national strategy on women's participation in conflict resolution.

32. Preparations continued for the handover of MINURCAT gender activities to the Ministry of Social Action and partners.

F. Civil affairs

33. MINURCAT continued to support local conflict resolution committees to help defuse local tensions and promote reconciliation and the voluntary and lasting return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin. Efforts were also focused on the consolidation of reconciliation activities for their handover to local authorities and their partners.

34. In the Dar Sila region, tensions between farmers and herders are common at the end of the rainy season. The Mission, together with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP, has been supporting the new Governor's efforts to revive and sustain the Committee for the Settlement of Land Disputes and Inter-community Conflicts. Support was provided to capacity-building workshops on mediation and sensitization programmes for the local population, as part of the Global Recovery Programme recently launched by UNDP in eastern Chad.

35. In the Borothea area (Ouaddaï region), several working sessions were held with UNHCR and implementing partners, as well as with the Prefect of Assoungha, to discuss means to sustain the inter-community dialogue project. It was agreed that

MINURCAT would support the first dialogue event, while UNHCR and the local non-governmental partner, Eirene, would continue the process after 31 December 2010.

G. HIV/AIDS

36. During the reporting period, MINURCAT continued its efforts to mainstream awareness of HIV/AIDS. The Mission provided and facilitated free access to voluntary confidential counselling and testing services both for its personnel and for the host population; some 438 people availed themselves of the services. Quick-impact projects funded education activities, including programmes on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS, were conducted in partnership with UNHCR in Brejine, Farchana, Gaga and Tréguine refugee camps.

37. In order to advance the gains made, UNAIDS has agreed to take over the Mission's activities and to support partners, including UNICEF, UNFPA and the Government of Chad, working in the area of HIV/AIDS.

H. Mine action

38. Owing to the rainy season, mine action activity was largely suspended until late September, when implementation of the mine risk education strategy commenced. The project is funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). A public-awareness campaign on explosive remnants of war and on the reporting hotline is informing local communities over the radio and by means of flyers of the hazards associated with handling such items and the methods for reporting them.

39. The remaining tasks, including verification of some 3,500 kilometres of road, clearance of 32 battlefield areas and 164 general mine action assessment tasks, are beyond the capacity of the Mission to complete before its withdrawal. Accordingly, discussions continued with the Chadian National Demining Centre in N'Djamena concerning the transfer of residual activities.

I. Military mandate of MINURCAT

40. Since the mandated reduction and reconfiguration of the MINURCAT force was achieved in July 2010, the force's strength has stabilized at 2,159 personnel, out of the 2,225 authorized. The sector divisions within the area of operations have been reconfigured to one force headquarters at Abéché and three sectors: two in eastern Chad and one in the Central African Republic. In eastern Chad, the new Sector North encompasses the Wadi-Fira and the Ouaddaï regions, with sector headquarters at Farchana. Sector South, encompassing the Dar-Sila and the Salamat regions, remains unchanged, with the sector headquarters remaining at Goz-Beida. Sector Birao in the Central African Republic is unchanged and consists of the Vakaga prefecture and the northern part of the Haute-Kotto prefecture, with the sector headquarters at Birao. The next phase of the reconfiguration will be the final withdrawal of the force, which will commence on 15 October 2010 and is to be completed by 31 December 2010.

41. In accordance with the drawdown plan, the camps at Bahaï and Guéréda were closed on 31 July. A residual military presence has been maintained in Iriba (Sector North) and Koukou-Angarana (Sector South) to provide protection to the remaining United Nations assets and personnel.

42. MINURCAT continued to perform all its mandated operational tasks, including quick reaction readiness, force protection duties and situational awareness in the vicinity of its cantonments. Limited escorts were provided for United Nations logistics convoys. In addition, contingency plans were reviewed and updated to ensure the Mission's preparedness to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence in its immediate vicinity and to maintain its ability to extract United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers in danger. A robust quick-reaction capability is maintained at Abéché and mobile reserves for the three sectors are based Farchana, Goz-Beida and Birao.

43. The two military helicopter units deployed within MINURCAT are now being withdrawn from Chad. One is being redeployed to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, while the other is being repatriated. Although that withdrawal will take place prior to the cessation of mandated military tasks, the Mission's civilian air assets should be sufficient to support its operations, including a quick reaction capacity for *in extremis* situations.

VII. Central African Republic

44. During the reporting period, the security situation in the north-eastern Central African Republic continued to suffer from inter-ethnic conflict, banditry and cross-border criminality. Those remained the main threats to security and stability in the Vakaga and Haute-Kotto regions. With 296 troops out of its authorized strength of 300 in the north-eastern Central African Republic, MINURCAT continued to implement its mandate.

45. On 5 September, an unidentified armed group attacked the village of Ouanda Djalle (Vakaga), 150 kilometres south of Birao. The group looted premises and reportedly abducted some 44 villagers, fatally shooting two of them. They returned to the village later the same day and burned 74 houses, rendering some 2,000 people homeless. On 11 September, an unidentified armed group clashed with the *Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR) at Penbele, about 25 kilometres south of Sam Ouandja (Haute-Kotto). Further attacks were reported on 27 and 30 September on the villages of Koumbal and Tiroungoulo, respectively, about 110 and 117 kilometres south of Birao. All the attacks allegedly involved elements of the Lord's Resistance Army. The veracity of the reports has not been independently ascertained. MINURCAT endeavoured to visit the sites of the attacks but was denied access by local leaders.

46. In anticipation of the Mission's withdrawal, the Government of the Central African Republic continued to express concern about the security situation in the Vakaga and the Haute-Kotto prefectures in the north-east of the country. At present, the Government maintains approximately 120 troops in Birao. These troops are lightly armed, have poor land mobility, no air capacity and receive minimal logistical and financial support. The Government has, therefore, expressed its intention to deploy a battalion-sized unit of the *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) to Birao.

47. The Government of the Central African Republic has repeatedly expressed its strong preference for receiving direct capacity-building assistance for its national forces and has initiated contact with several potential bilateral partners. It has established a task force composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FACA and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to examine security arrangements in the north-east. The task force held its first meeting on 2 September and work has begun on drawing up a list of the needs of the national army to support a possible deployment in Birao.

48. The assistance sought by the Government of the Central African Republic to improve the capability of its armed forces, including lethal equipment, by far exceeds what the United Nations might be able to provide. MINURCAT plans provide for the transfer to the Government, within the terms of the relevant financial regulations and rules of its camp sites in the town of Birao and near the airstrip. The new road between the two camps will have been completed by MINURCAT before it completes its withdrawal from the area in early November. With regard to requests for the military equipment of MINURCAT, that equipment remains the national assets of the respective troop-contributing countries. I have requested that BINUCA continue its efforts to support the Government in its endeavour to secure bilateral capacity-building assistance for its national forces.

49. It is clear that, when MINURCAT commences its withdrawal from Birao on 21 October 2010, the national forces of the Central African Republic may not immediately be in a position to deploy and sustain additional troops. In order to further inform the Security Council and potential bilateral partners of the threat to security in the Vakaga region, I have deployed a team to undertake a review of the prevailing security environment and a threat assessment, and will share its main findings with the Security Council.

VIII. Mission support

50. During the reporting period, MINURCAT continued to maintain four operational bases (Abéché, Farchana, Goz Beida and Birao), as well as its operational and main headquarters in Abéché and N'Djamena, respectively. The Mission also continued to support a small residual presence in Iriba.

51. Progress was achieved in the construction of hard-wall police stations and posts for DIS in eastern Chad. Work began in August and September in 17 out of the 19 planned locations. The procurement process for the remaining two, in the Iridimi and Touloum refugee camps, was delayed by issues related to land ownership. They have now been resolved and construction is about to commence. MINURCAT has also finished the construction of basic vehicle workshops for DIS in 19 locations. Fuel storage facilities have been established in all DIS stations and posts. MINURCAT has also completed the installation of perimeter security arrangements for all DIS locations. The construction of a dormitory for 220 cadets and the extension of fully equipped kitchen facilities at the police academy in N'Djamena, supported by the trust fund, are advanced. The well-drilling projects for DIS stations and posts, which would also benefit local communities, are to start be started at the end of the rainy season.

52. Efforts are focused on completing as much of the mandated construction as possible by 31 December 2010. But, as I noted at the time the mandate for MINURCAT was under consideration (see S/2010/217, para. 94), not all the construction can be completed by that date. Accordingly, arrangements are being made to complete it during the liquidation period.

53. Integrated plans are being implemented to support the mandated withdrawal of the Mission's military and civilian components between 15 October and 31 December 2010. All equipment has been classified in accordance with the regulations established by the General Assembly and a list of surplus equipment has been made available to other peacekeeping missions. Plans have also been prepared for the liquidation of the Mission, which is expected to last into the second quarter of 2011.

54. As the Mission withdraws and prepares for liquidation, the direct support provided to DIS will progressively decrease, both in terms of geographical scope and functionality, and will cease on 31 December 2010.

IX. Observations

55. As in the past, the rainy season has brought with it a reduction in violence in eastern Chad. Improved relations between Chad and the Sudan, and the vigilance of the national and joint-border security forces, have also been cited as important contributing factors. The heavy rains, coupled with existing food shortages, have, however, intensified the humanitarian needs in many parts of the country, most particularly in the east where hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons are located.

56. In the few remaining months of the MINURCAT mandate, considerable efforts are being expended to consolidate the initiatives of the past three years. Lessons drawn from this unique undertaking will be reflected in my final report on the implementation of the Mission's mandate, in December. The exercise by the Government of Chad of its sovereign responsibility for the protection of civilians, including in securing the space for humanitarian assistance operations, is vital. In this context, its unwavering commitment to assuming the continuation of the DIS role has been reiterated on numerous occasions.

57. After only three years since its inception, the DIS force remains in a formative stage. It has succeeded in demonstrating that it can make a difference to the security of the vulnerable populations in the east. This hard-won progress relied on considerable support from the international community. Technical and administrative support was almost entirely provided by MINURCAT. Equally, funding was almost entirely dependent on the generous and sustained contributions made by the donor community. The future development of DIS will depend on sustained attention, including in the areas of training, oversight and resources.

58. The Government is seeking sustained international donor support for DIS next year. DIS must not be allowed to fail because of lack of funding. Understandably, especially in the current economic climate, Member States are looking for assurances that the resources they commit are put to best use. Arrangements are being considered for UNDP and UNHCR to establish and administer a successor

trust fund for DIS, should that be the desire of the Government and potential donors, until the requisite national structures and capacity are assured.

59. In my previous reports, I noted that the mandated construction projects in support of DIS operations, including the drilling of water wells for police stations, were unlikely to be completed before 31 December 2010. A small cell of engineers and administrative staff will therefore stay as part of the liquidation team for the Mission and will oversee the completion of these projects. It is my expectation that these projects will be finalized by the end of the liquidation period.

60. Until the conditions for large-scale voluntary and sustainable return are assured, the demands placed by hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons on the host population's depleted resources heighten the risk of tensions. I am, therefore, encouraged by a number of recent initiatives undertaken by the Chadian authorities to enhance security and services in a number of areas as a means of encouraging the sustained return of the internally displaced to their places of origin. The United Nations system will do its best to assist the Government in this regard. I call on other international partners to provide support also.

61. The protection of civilians in eastern Chad consists of more than assuring the physical security of refugees, the displaced and humanitarian workers and the provision of logistical support and hard-wall structures for DIS. Intercommunity dialogue, the enhancement of local governance structures, including justice and prisons, respect for human rights and the creation of socio-economic incentives for the safe and voluntary return of the displaced are mutually interdependent requirements for the protection of civilians, and depend ultimately on the host Government. While MINURCAT is working with potential partners to ensure the continuation of these tasks, the Government's commitment to seeing them to fruition will be critical.

62. The final phase of the drawdown of the United Nations military component from Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic will commence on 15 October 2010. By 31 December 2010 all uniformed and civilian staff, except those essential for the Mission's liquidation, will be withdrawn.

63. The recent attacks in Ouanda Djallé, Penbele, Koumbal and Kouroungoulo in the north-eastern Central African Republic are a source of concern. In preparation for the withdrawal of MINURCAT, in my report to the Council of 30 July 2010 (S/2010/409) I presented two options for the north-eastern Central African Republic for the period following the withdrawal of MINURCAT. The Government has since repeatedly stated its preference for the receipt of direct bilateral support to build up the capacity of its security forces. In this context, the Government has approached a number of potential partner countries. I urge Member States to respond favourably to the request of the Government of the Central African Republic for assistance to ensure that there is no gap between the departure of MINURCAT and the further deployment of trained and equipped national forces to the Vakaga region.

64. As the MINURCAT mandate nears its end, I would like to thank my Special Representative for MINURCAT, Youssef Mahmoud, and all the men and women of MINURCAT for their service to the cause of peace and security. Finally, I would like to extend my appreciation to all the countries that have contributed troops and police to MINURCAT, as well as donors to the DIS Trust Fund, for their unfailing support of the Mission.

Annex

Military and police strength as at 11 October 2010

Country	Military				Civilian police
	Liaison officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total	
Bangladesh	2	4	129	135	—
Benin	3	—	—	3	3
Burkina Faso	—	2	—	2	14
Cameroon	—	—	—	—	4
Côte d'Ivoire	—	—	—	—	16
Democratic Republic of the Congo	—	1	—	1	—
Egypt	2	1	—	3	7
Ethiopia	—	2	—	2	—
Finland	—	—	—	—	3
France	—	—	—	—	8
Ghana	2	4	522	528	—
Guinea	—	—	—	—	8
Ireland	—	10	—	10	—
Jordan	—	—	—	—	16
Kenya	—	3	—	3	—
Madagascar	—	—	—	—	6
Mali	1	—	—	1	12
Mongolia	—	4	264	268	—
Namibia	—	5	—	5	—
Nepal	1	8	573	582	—
Niger	—	—	—	—	4
Nigeria	1	4	—	5	—
Norway	—	1	—	1	—
Pakistan	2	4	—	6	—
Poland	—	2	—	2	—
Russian Federation	—	—	119	119	—
Rwanda	1	—	—	1	2
Senegal	3	9	—	12	8
Serbia	—	—	14	14	—
Sri Lanka	—	2	72	74	—
Togo	—	2	356	358	—
Tunisia	4	2	—	6	—
Turkey	—	—	—	—	3
United States of America	—	2	—	2	—
Yemen	—	—	—	—	14
Total	22	72	2 049	2 143	128



**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 12 October 2010 from the Permanent Representative
of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter dated 6 October 2010 from General Antoine Gambi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and Francophonie of the Central African Republic, forwarding the requirements statement of the Central African Republic's armed forces in the light of the outcome of the recent meeting of the Security Council concerning the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Fernand **Poukré-Kono**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 12 October 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In reference to the outcome of the recent meeting of the United Nations Security Council concerning the withdrawal of MINURCAT, I have the honour to transmit herewith the requirements statement of the Central African Republic's armed forces, bearing in mind the imperative need to strengthen their operational capacities following this withdrawal (see enclosure).

I should be grateful for any arrangements you might make to ensure its favourable consideration by the members of the Council and for any positive follow-up.

(Signed) Antoine **Gambi**

Enclosure

Central African Republic
Unity-Dignity-Labour

Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic in charge of
the protection of former combatants and war victims,
disarmament, and the restructuring of the army

Army Chief of staff

Operations command centre

**Requirements statement of the security battalion for the
Vakaga (Birao) and Haute Kotto (Sam Ouandja) regions**

1. Short-term deployment requirements (90 days)

1. Military items
2. Food rations
3. Drinking water
4. Vehicles
5. Fuel
6. Communications
7. Weapons-chargers-ammunition
8. Miscellaneous construction supplies
9. Operational training requirements

2. Medium-term requirements

1. Aircraft
2. Aircraft fuel
3. Vehicle fuel
4. Food rations
5. Drinking water
6. Ammunition

I. Military items

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Combat clothing	25	1 000	25 000,00	32 750,00	16 375 000
Green military clothing	3	1 000	3 000,00	3 930,00	1 965 000
Boots	23	1 000	23 000,00	30 130,00	15 065 000
Regulation belt	3	500	1 500,00	1 965,00	982 500
Belt	2	500	1 000,00	1 310,00	655 000
Long socks	2	1 000	2 000,00	2 620,00	1 310 000
Bulletproof jacket	923	500	461 500,00	604 565,00	302 282 500
Heavy helmet	250	500	125 000,00	163 750,00	81 875 000
F1 rucksack	35	500	17 500,00	22 925,00	11 462 500
Sleeping bag	30	500	15 000,00	19 650,00	9 825 000
Can	7	500	3 500,00	4 585,00	2 292 500
Binoculars	90	20	1 800,00	2 358,00	1 179 000
Compass	24	50	1 200,00	1 572,00	786 000
Mess tin	12	500	6 000,00	7 860,00	3 930 000
Poncho	11	500	5 500,00	7 205,00	3 602 500
Shared tent	4 400	8	35 200,00	46 112,00	23 056 000
Individual tent	40	250	10 000,00	13 100,00	6 550 000
Mosquito net bedding	59	500	29 500,00	38 645,00	19 322 500
Chair	25	200	5 000,00	6 550,00	3 275 000
Table	100	200	20 000,00	26 200,00	13 100 000
Total			792 200,00	1 037 782,00	518 891 000

II. Food rations

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price/day</i>	<i>Number of persons</i>	<i>Food ration/month (CFA)</i>	<i>Food ration/year (CFA)</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>
Officer	12 000	32	11 520 000	138 240 000	211 053,44	276 480,00
Non-commissioned officer	10 000	106	31 800 000	381 600 000	582 595,42	763 200,00
Soldier	8 000	369	88 560 000	1 062 720 000	1 622 473,28	2 125 440,00
Total			131 880 000	1 582 560 000	2 416 122,14	3 165 120,00

III. Drinking water

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price</i>	<i>Number of persons</i>	<i>Cost/month (CFA)</i>	<i>Cost/year (CFA)</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>
Water	500	504	37 800 000	453 600 000	692 519,08	907 200,00
Total			37 800 000	453 600 000	692 519,08	907 200,00

IV. Vehicles

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Pick-up vehicle 4 x 4 (BJ80)		19	0,00	0,00	0
Tactical combat vehicle		14	0,00	0,00	0
Heavy carrier (troop transportation)		2	0,00	0,00	0
Ambulance		3	0,00	0,00	0
Heavy breakdown truck		1	0,00	0,00	0
Breakdown vehicle LO17		2	0,00	0,00	0
Fuel tanker		1	0,00	0,00	0
Water tanker		1	0,00	0,00	0
Water trailer		3	0,00	0,00	0
Kitchen trailer		2	0,00	0,00	0
Total			0,00	0,00	0

V. Vehicle fuel

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price in CFA</i>	<i>Quantity/month in litres</i>	<i>Quantity/year in litres</i>	<i>Annual cost in CFA</i>	<i>Annual cost in €</i>	<i>Annual cost in \$</i>
Diesel	800	30 000	360 000	288 000 000	439 694,66	576 000,00
Gasoline	810	4 000	48 000	38 880 000	59 358,78	77 760,00
Total				326 880 000	469 053,44	653 760,00

VI. Communications

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Thuraya phones		12	0	0	0
VHF 1.5W set		64	0	0	0
VHF 5W set		12	0	0	0
HF VHF set		13	0	0	0
UHF set		1	0	0	0

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit price in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Rechargeable battery		128	0	0	0
Charger		64	0	0	0
Motorola relays		5	0	0	0
Power generator		4	0	0	0
Total			0	0	0

VII. Weapons-chargers-ammunition

A. Weapons

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
PA		86	0,00	0,00	0
AK47		450	0,00	0,00	0
DKM 7.62		31	0,00	0,00	0
RPG7		30	0,00	0,00	0
M-81		4	0,00	0,00	0
14.5 m		4	0,00	0,00	0
Total			0,00	0,00	0

B. Chargers

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
AK47		1 800	0,00	0,00	0
DKM 7.62 chain		310	0,00	0,00	0
PA charger		172	0,00	0,00	0
Total			0	0	0

C. Ammunition

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in €</i>	<i>Number of rounds</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
9 mm		100	0,00	0,00	0
7.62 mm short		1 000	0,00	0,00	0
7.62 long		500	0,00	0,00	0
12.7 mm		1 000	0,00	0,00	0
14.5 mm		1 000	0,00	0,00	0
M-81 shell		500	0,00	0,00	0
Hand grenade		100	0,00	0,00	0
RPG7 rocket		500	0,00	0,00	0
Total			0,00	0,00	0

VIII. Miscellaneous construction supplies

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Wheelbarrow	46	100	4 600,00	6 026,00	3 013 000
Shovel	11	400	4 400,00	5 764,00	2 882 000
Pickaxe	10	400	4 000,00	5 240,00	2 620 000
Machete	10	400	4 000,00	5 240,00	2 620 000
Axe	9	100	900,00	1 179,00	589 500
Total			17 900,00	23 449,00	11 724 500

IX. Operational training requirements

Training:

500 men for operational preparation

Duration: 3 weeks per company

1. Personnel

Training to be determined

- Members of the Central African armed forces

2. Level of training

(a) Company level

(b) General staff level

(c) 3-week duration

3. Food rations

Duration: three (3) weeks per company

X 32 x 12 000 F x 21 days = 8 064 000 CFA

Y 106 x 10 000 F x 21 days = 22 260 000 CFA

Z 349 x 8 000 F x 21 days = 61 992 000 CFA

Total 92 316 000 CFA

4. Fuel

<i>Description</i>	<i>Requested quantity</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Diesel	1 000 litres	1 000 L x 800 F = 800 000 CFA
Gasoline	500 litres	500 L x 810 F = 405 000 CFA

5. Target training

<i>Description</i>	<i>Requested quantity</i>	<i>Amount</i>
7.62 mm short cartridges	75 000	75 000 x 400 F = 30 000 000 CFA
Wooden targets	20	20 x 20 000 F = 400 000 CFA
Combat targets and silhouettes	200	200 x 10 000 F = 2 000 000 CFA

6. Supplies

<i>Description</i>	<i>Requested quantity</i>	<i>Amount</i>
200 page notebooks	500	500 x 500 F = 250 000 CFA
Pens	10 boxes	10 x 5 000 F = 50 000 CFA
Chalk	5 boxes	5 x 2 000 F = 10 000 CFA

7. Classroom equipment

<i>Description</i>	<i>Requested quantity</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Overhead projector	1	1 x 600 000 F = 600 000 CFA
Laptop	6	6 x 600 000 F = 3 600 000 CFA
Printer	6	6 x 300 000 F = 1 800 000 CFA
Projection screen	2	2 x 100 000 F = 200 000 CFA

Total training costs 132 431 000 CFA

Aircraft

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in €</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Cost in €</i>	<i>Cost in \$</i>	<i>Cost in CFA</i>
Twin-engine light aircraft		1	0,00	0,00	0
Combat helicopter		2	0,00	0,00	0
Transport helicopter		2	0,00	0,00	0
Troop transport aircraft		1	0,00	0,00	0
Total			0,00	0,00	0

NB: Costs are determined according to the following parameters:

1. Location where deployed
2. Flight cost per hour
3. Length of deployment
4. Type of aircraft
5. Crew composition
6. Number of sorties

Aircraft fuel

<i>Description</i>	<i>Unit cost in CFA</i>	<i>Quantity/mo. in l</i>	<i>Quantity/mo. in l</i>	<i>Annual cost in CFA</i>	<i>Annual cost in €</i>	<i>Annual cost in \$</i>
Aviation fuel	2 150	0	0	0	0,00	0,00
Jet fuel	600	0	0	0	0,00	0,00
Total				0	0,00	0,00

Summary table

<i>Description</i>	<i>Short term (90 days)</i>			<i>Medium term</i>		
	<i>In CFA</i>	<i>In €</i>	<i>In \$</i>	<i>In CFA</i>	<i>In €</i>	<i>In \$</i>
Military items	518 891 000			6 226 692 000	9 506 400,00	12 453 384,00
Food rations	395 840 000			1 582 560 000	2 416 122,14	3 165 120,00
Drinking water	113 400 000			453 600 000	692 519,08	907 200,00
Vehicles				0	0,00	0,00
Aircraft				0	0,00	0,00
Vehicle fuel	81 720 000			326 880 000	499 053,44	653 760,00
Aircraft fuel	0			0	0,00	0,00
Communications				0	0,00	0,00
Weapons				0	0,00	0,00
Chargers				0	0,00	0,00
Ammunition				0	0,00	0,00
Miscellaneous construction supplies				11 724 500	17 900,00	23 449,00
Training	397 293 000				0,00	0,00
Total	1 506 944 000	2 318 375,38	3 013 888,00	8 601 456 500	13 131 994,66	17 202 913,00

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Agenda items 34, 39 and 75

**Security Council
Sixty-fifth year****Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their
implications for international peace, security
and development****The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan****Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts****Letter dated 13 October 2010 from the Permanent Representative
of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I would like to draw your attention to the statement made on 25 September 2009 by Mr. Edward Nalbandian, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, in the general debate of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly. This statement has become yet another solid piece of evidence of Armenia's destructive position, annexationist intentions and racist ideology.

The emotional outburst, in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia went through the traditional depiction of his country as an eternal victim, not only made it clear that the officials in Yerevan continue to remain under the disastrous influence of their confused history, trying to make as much as possible out of it to justify the policy of flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, but also illustrated that Armenia is far from even thinking of engaging in a sober and efficient search for peace in the region.

It is amazing that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia — the country which bears primary responsibility for unleashing the war of aggression against Azerbaijan, carrying out ethnic cleansing, committing other serious international crimes during the conflict and advocating undisguised racist ideology — prefers to criticize the neighbouring countries and lecture them on the issues pertaining to such notions as peace, human rights, negotiations and the settlement of conflicts.

While trying to accuse Azerbaijan of allegedly suppressing Armenians during Soviet rule, "attempting to cleanse them from their ancestral home" and unleashing



brutal war, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia stubbornly passes over in silence the facts irrefutably testifying to the opposite.

Thus, over the 70 years of Soviet rule, Armenia succeeded in expanding its territory, mostly at the expense of Azerbaijani lands, and using every possible means to expel the Azerbaijanis from their places of origin. Suffice it to say that, during the Soviet period, the territory of Armenia increased from 8,000-10,000 to 29,800 square kilometres. As a result, the Nakhchivan region of Azerbaijan was cut off from the main body of the country. There is not a single Azerbaijani remaining in present-day Armenia of the more than half million Azerbaijani people who lived there when Soviet rule was established in the region. These facts are supported by numerous documents and acknowledged in Armenian official and academic sources.

Moreover, in the 1920s, the ancestral land of Azerbaijan — mountainous Garabakh (Nagorny Karabakh) — was given the status of autonomy within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, and its administrative borders were defined in such a way as to ensure that a small Armenian population constituted a majority in this autonomy. At the same time, a significantly larger Azerbaijani population residing in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia at that time was refused the same privilege, and attempts to so much as mention this were promptly, roughly and savagely suppressed.

The Armenian side's "forgetfulness" also frequently concerns the chronology of events pertaining to the beginning of the present-day stage of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In reality, large-scale military actions on the territory of Azerbaijan were preceded by the attacks, at the end of 1987, on the Azerbaijanis in Khankandi (during the Soviet period, Stepanakert) and Armenia, resulting in first civilian casualties and a flood of Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons. At the same time, a number of illegal declarations and decisions were taken by both Armenia and the Armenian community of Nagorny Karabakh, with a view to securing the unilateral secession of the autonomy from Azerbaijan.

Shortly after the assertion of claims on Nagorny Karabakh at the end of the 1980s, under instructions from and with the blessing of the Armenian authorities, about 230,000 Azerbaijanis remaining in Armenia were forcibly deported from their homes. This process was accompanied by killings, torture, enforced disappearances, the destruction of property and pillaging throughout Armenia. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis. During only three days, from 27 to 29 November 1988, 33 Azerbaijanis were killed in the course of pogroms in the Armenian towns of Gugark, Spitak and Stepanavan. In all, 216 Azerbaijanis were killed in Armenia in 1987-1989, including children, women and elderly people.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia must be well informed that, long before the world witnessed the horrifying terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001 and from that date onward in different countries, the Armenian secret service and various Armenian terrorist organizations have been actively engaged in perpetrating terrorist acts on the territory of Azerbaijan, targeting civilian objects, including industrial units and means of air, sea and land transport. It is a fact that, as a result of such acts perpetrated since the late 1980s, over 2,000 citizens of Azerbaijan have been killed, the majority of them women, the elderly and children (for more information, see United Nations documents A/C.6/50/4 and A/C.6/51/5). Against this background and taking into consideration that international Armenian terrorism has bloody historic antecedents connected

with the perpetration of numerous terrorist acts in various countries and killings of tens of foreign citizens and diplomats, the hopeless attempts of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia to link Azerbaijan with mercenary and terrorist activity seem curious, to say the least.

At the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, the conflict entered into a military phase and Armenia initiated combat operations on the territory of Azerbaijan. That period was marked by an increase in the magnitude, intensity and consistency of the attacks. In February 1992, the town of Khojaly in Azerbaijan was notoriously overrun and its population was subjected to an unprecedented massacre. In its judgment of 22 April 2010, the European Court of Human Rights determined that the acts of particular gravity committed by the Armenian military forces against the Azerbaijani civilian population of Khojaly might amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In sum, the ongoing armed conflict in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan has resulted in the occupation of almost one fifth of the territory of Azerbaijan and has made approximately one out of every nine persons in the country an internally displaced person or refugee. The war led to the deaths and wounding of thousands of Azerbaijanis, the majority of them women, the elderly and children. The aggression against Azerbaijan has severely damaged the socio-economic sphere of the country. In addition, no single Azerbaijani historic and cultural monument was left undamaged, and no sacred site escaped desecration both in the occupied territories and in Armenia.

The documentary evidence — and there is a mountain of it — proves that Armenia unleashed the war; attacked Azerbaijan and occupied its territories, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts; carried out ethnic cleansing on a massive scale; and established the ethnically constructed subordinate separatist entity on the captured Azerbaijani territory. The high-ranking officials in Yerevan confirmed more than once that the regular armed forces of the Republic of Armenia invaded and occupied the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Thus, one of the most recent examples concerns the words of President Serj Sargsyan of the Republic of Armenia, who stated during his visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Headquarters in May 2010 that “[o]ur army was born and baptized in the battlefield and the core of the Armenian officers, top officers, led by the Minister and the Army Chief of Staff, have a wealth of experience of warfare and it’s a positive experience, a successful experience” (see press point with the NATO Secretary General and the President of Armenia at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_63920.htm). Indeed, the cynicism of the Armenian officials has no limits.

There are also irrefutable facts testifying the active use, by Armenia, of mercenaries to attack Azerbaijan (for more information, see the note by the Secretary-General, entitled “Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination” (A/49/362, paras. 69-72)).

Accordingly, what the Armenian side considers “the exercise of the right to self-determination” by the Armenian minority group in Azerbaijan has been unequivocally qualified by the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as by other authoritative international organizations, as the illegal use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The illegality of the separatist entity and its structures, established by the Republic of Armenia on the occupied territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, has been repeatedly stated at the international level in the most unambiguous manner. No State in the international community has recognized the separatist entity as independent, not even Armenia, though it exercises effective control over the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and provides indispensable economic, political and military sustenance without which that illegal entity could not exist.

Contrary to the approach of the Armenian side based on attempts to legalize the results of the use of force and ethnic cleansing, the principle of self-determination represents a legitimate process carried out in accordance with international and domestic law within precisely identified limits. This important principle exists in reality as a rule of international law and, as such, applies to the peoples of the colonially defined territorial units and peoples subjected to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, including peoples under foreign military occupation. There can be no doubt that persons belonging to the Armenian minority group and residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan have nothing to do with either of these categories of peoples.

The principle of self-determination also provides for the participation of peoples in the governance of their States. In this context, the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are entitled to the full benefit of international human rights provisions, including the right to self-determination within the boundaries of the Republic of Azerbaijan and as part of its population, which is the primary subject of the right to self-determination under international law.

The critical factor in addressing the issue of self-determination with regard to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is that all actions aimed at tearing away a part of the territory of Azerbaijan were unlawful and constituted a violation of the fundamental norm of respect for the territorial integrity of States, as well as a violation of other peremptory norms of general international law. In its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed that the illegality attached to unilateral secessions stems from the fact that "they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (*jus cogens*)".

Consequently, the claims of Armenia, which resorted to the unlawful use of force to occupy the territory of Azerbaijan and committed the most serious international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and even genocide, are contrary to and unsustainable under international law. Therefore, the destructive political agenda of Armenia aimed at dismemberment of multi-ethnic societies and legalization of a product of aggression and outrageous manifestation of ethnic differentiation is fated never to be realized.

It seems that only the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and his subordinates are unaware that, since 1945, no separatist entity created by the unlawful use of force and ethnic cleansing has been admitted to the United Nations and recognized by the international community.

Besides, the Government of the Republic of Armenia, which has purged both the territory of its own country and the occupied areas of Azerbaijan of all non-Armenians and thus succeeded in creating mono-ethnic cultures there, should

be the last one advocating unilateral secessions of ethnic minority groups from sovereign States.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia pretends to be preoccupied with Azerbaijan's oil revenues and its military budget increase. At the same time, he omits to say that the annual defence spending of Azerbaijan remains in line with overall budget increases; that Azerbaijan continues to spend a much smaller percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the army than Armenia; and that the size of the armed forces of Azerbaijan is proportional to its population, territory and length of borders and remains less than Armenia's. It is worthwhile mentioning that President Serj Sargsyan of the Republic of Armenia stated, on 25 May 2010, during his visit to NATO Headquarters, that "[t]he Armenian army has types of ammunition that countries ten times the size of Armenia would dream of having" (see press point with the NATO Secretary General and the President of Armenia, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_63920.htm). These words are self-explanatory.

The Armenian side also does not clarify that the arms control mechanism is not effective in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and that Armenia deploys, beyond international control, a great number of armaments and ammunitions in these territories.

The statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia has not become an exception from usual speculations and misinterpretations by Armenian officials as to the true value of the conflict settlement process.

It is unprecedented and absurd that, against the background of the continuing occupation by Armenia of the territories of Azerbaijan, the former has the cheek to blame the victim of aggression for allegedly rejecting the proposal to sign an agreement on the non-use of force. It should be made clear in this regard that there are two lawful exceptions to the United Nations Charter's broad ban on the use of inter-State force, and both are prescribed in the Charter itself. One of these exceptions relates to the exercise of the right of self-defence (Article 51). It is obvious that the principle of the non-use of force, which has been flagrantly violated by Armenia, must be reaffirmed in inter-State relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the settlement of the conflict and applied following the complete withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Accordingly, any speculations on this issue by the Armenian side are none other than a primitive propagandistic trick.

In reality, as a country suffering from the occupation of its territories and the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of its citizens, Azerbaijan is the most interested party in the earliest negotiated settlement of the conflict and removal of its consequences. Azerbaijan has clearly and unequivocally demonstrated its aspiration towards a resolution of the conflict based on international law and strives to make full use of all political and diplomatic resources available to it. My Government has repeatedly stated its readiness to guarantee the highest level of self-rule for Nagorny Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan, although it is not an easy decision, as may seem at first sight, taking into consideration the externally imposed creation of autonomy in Nagorny Karabakh in the Soviet period, the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia and the heavy burden of the present conflict in view of human losses and sufferings.

On the contrary, by asserting that "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh exercised their right to self-determination" the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia confirmed once again that the Armenian side considers the conflict settlement process only as a means of achieving the annexation of Azerbaijani territories that it has captured through military force and in which it has carried out ethnic cleansing.

The statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia contains reference to the principles and elements proposed by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but at the same time, he omits to add that these principles and elements purport to "reflect a reasonable compromise based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (see the joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the Presidents of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America at the L'Aquila Group of Eight Summit, 10 July 2009).

In this regard, the natural question arises as to what compromise the Armenian side has in mind in saying that "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh [have already] exercised their right to self-determination". Clarifications of this question are essential also because the withdrawal of Armenian military forces only from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region cannot be introduced as a compromise, insofar as it is the obligation of Armenia under international law to put an end to its illegal occupation of these territories.

Furthermore, while referring to the principles and elements proposed by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia passes over in silence that Armenia has not yet clarified whether it accepts them in their entirety.

It is obvious that, by insisting on unrealistic claims, attempting to mislead the international community, giving preference to bellicose rhetoric and resorting to provocative actions, Armenia attempts to discredit the ongoing political process, at the core of which is the settlement formula based on putting an end to the illegal Armenian occupation, the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and ensuring the peaceful coexistence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region within the Republic of Azerbaijan.

We consider this stance of Armenia an open challenge to the conflict settlement process and a serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The earlier the officials of this country realize the lack of any perspective of their unconstructive and dangerous political agenda, the sooner our peoples will be able to benefit from peace, stability and cooperation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39 and 75, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and
their implications for international peace,
security and development**

**The situation in the occupied territories
of Azerbaijan**

**Responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts**

**Letter dated 13 October 2010 from the Permanent Representative
of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, recorded for the months of August and September 2010 (see annex).

It is worthwhile to mention that regular and deliberate violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia during the aforementioned period, in particular their repeated incursions across the Line of Contact, resulted in the deaths of three Azerbaijani soldiers.

My Government strongly protests against the provocative actions of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia on the Line of Contact, which are illustrative of the consistent disrespect by this Member State of its obligations both under international law and within the ongoing political process towards the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39 and 75, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 13 October 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Armenia^a for the months of August and September 2010

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
1 August	21.45-21.55	Five	Mosegerkh village, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.20-23.30		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.40-17.45		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.30-19.20		Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	10.00-10.15		Unknown heights, Kuropatkino village, Khojavend region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.50-22.00				
	22.00-22.15				
	23.30-00.00				
2 August	00.50-01.00	Two	Saridjali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.15-03.25		Goyarkh village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
5 August	20.25-20.55	Five	Gorgan village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.25-20.55		Seysulan, Goyarkh and Gizil Oba villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.50-23.50				
	23.25-23.55				
	21.30-23.55		Unknown heights, Khojavend region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

^a Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or close to fire point areas.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
6 August	00.30-00.40	One	Yusifjanli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
10 August	18.20-18.40 19.10-19.40	Five	Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.35-20.45		Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.30-21.35		Berdavan village, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.20-23.30		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.40-23.55 23.15-00.10		Garakhanbayli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	—	—
12 August	21.30-21.40	Two	Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.30-22.45 23.25-23.30 23.15-23.20		Gorgan and Ashagi Abdulrahmanli villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
13 August	06.00-06.10	Three	Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	12.20-12.35 18.45-18.55		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.20-17.35		Chayli village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
15 August	10.40-11.00	Three	Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.15-14.30		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.50-23.05 23.10-23.30		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
16 August	04.00-04.25	Three	Chayli village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.00-17.20		Tapgaragoyunlu and Gulustan villages, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
17 August	00.30-00.35 01.00-01.00	Six	Sarijali and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	10.00-11.40		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	16.20-16.30		Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.10-19.25		Unknown heights, Goygol region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.05-20.15 22.00-22.15		Garakhanbayli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.50-21.10		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
18 August	00.05-00.30	Five	Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	09.00-09.35 15.50-16.10		Unknown heights, Goygol region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.00-19.20		Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.00-19.30		Berkaber village, Idjevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.30-20.50		Mosesgerkh village, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
19 August	22.45-22.50	One	Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
20 August	00.55-01.10 03.40-03.55	Six	Javahirli and Shikhlar villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	02.50-03.10		Seysulan village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	11.20-11.25		Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.15-14.30		Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	15.20-16.10		Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
21 August	00.10-00.40	Two	Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	01.00-01.25		Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
22 August	13.00-13.05	One	Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
23 August	00.05-00.15	Four	Sarijali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.05-00.20		Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.40-21.00		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.10-23.25		Goyarkh village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
24 August	15.30-15.40 21.00-21.05	Five	Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	16.00-16.10		Unknown heights, Goygol region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.30-17.40		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
	23.40-23.46		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.30-21.50 22.20-22.30		Shurabad, Yusifjanli and Kangarli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
25 August	00.45-01.10	Five	Unknown heights, Gadabay region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	01.30-01.40		Shurabad, Yusifjanli and Kangarli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.45-21.57		Sarijali and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
26 August	00.00-00.25	Three	Sarijali and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.05-03.15		Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.00-19.10		Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
27 August	07.10-07.20	Three	Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.30-22.40		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.30-22.40		Yusifjanli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
28 August	04.10-04.25	One	Gizil Oba village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
29 August	13.40-13.50	Five	Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
30 August	15.20-15.55	Three	Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.30-17.45		Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.15-21.30 23.50-00.00		Yusifjanli and Sarijali villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.10-00.15 02.20-02.45		Chayli and Chilaburt villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.30-21.35		Unknown heights, Berd region, Armenia	—	—
31 August	22.50-22.55	Five	Voskepar village, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.30-01.15		Chayli village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.50-19.00		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	15.00-16.00		Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	16.30-16.40 23.40-01.35		Chayli and Gizil Hajili villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	Soldiers of Azerbaijani Army — Vugar Amirov, 19, and Parvin Abdullayev, 19, were killed
1 September	18.30-18.40	One	Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
2 September	03.00-03.35 05.10-05.30	Four	Gizil Oba and Chayli villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
3 September	10.30-11.30	One	Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.40-23.50		Sarijali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.20-00.45		Gapanli village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
5 September	07.25-08.15	Eight	Chilaburt, Goyarkh, Seysulan and Gizil Oba villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
6 September	19.00-19.25	Seventeen	Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.45-21.25				
	11.15-11.35				
	13.00-13.15		Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.50-23.05		Javahirli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.30-15.00		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.40-01.15		Chilaburt, Goyarkh, Seysulan and Gizil Oba villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	00.45-00.55		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	01.00-01.20				
	03.45-04.15				
	04.10-04.30				
	02.35-02.55				
	03.30-04.00		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.00-15.00				
	13.30-13.55				
	15.30-15.45		Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
7 September	17.30-17.50	Eleven	Garagashli, Sarijali, Suraabad, Shikhlar and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.05-22.40		Aygepar and Mosesgerkh villages, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.45-23.07				
	19.45-21.10				
	23.30-23.50		Chakhirli village, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.05-23.40				
	23.10-23.35		Horadiz village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	01.05-01.30		Garagashli, Sarijali, Suraabad, Shikhlar and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	05-50-06.05				
	21.30-22.10		Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
8 September	20.40-21.05	Three	Chakhirli village, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.40-21.05		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.10-17.20		Garagashli, Javahirli and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.45-19.00				
	21.55-22.25				
10 September	00.30-00.50	Two	Garagashli, Javahirli and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	05.20-05.45				
	07.50-08.15		Goran village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.40-18.50		Kurapatkino village, Khojavend region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.30-18.50				

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
12 September	09.15-09.35 17.25-17.30	Four	Berdavan and Davekh villages, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.00-21.25 21.10-21.30		Ashagi Seyidahmadli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.45-23.00		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
13 September	00.20-00.40	Five	Berdavan and Davekh villages, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	08.10-08.20		Garagashli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.00-20.20 20.05-20.15		Voskevan village, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	20.05-20.15		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
14 September	02.35-02.50	Seven	Sarijali and Yusifjanli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.10-04.00		Garakhanbayli, Horadiz and Gorgan villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.25-04.00		Chayli and Seysulan villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
15 September	21.15-21.30	Two	Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.50-15.00		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
16 September	23.10-23.20	Four	Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
	23.40-00.00		Unknown heights, Khojavend region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.50-22.00 23.40-23.50		Sarijali and Garagashli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
17 September	00.30-00.40	One	Sarijali and Garagashli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
19 September	14.15-14.25	Three	Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	15.30-15.35		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	21.45-22.05		Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
20 September	15.45-16.15 20.20-20.55	Five	Garagashli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.20-18.45		Unknown heights, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	14.45-15.10 18.45-19.00 23.00-23.35		Seysulan, Chayli and Gizil Oba villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
22 September	00.45-00.50	Five	Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	17.10-17.20		Chinarli village, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.00-19.20		Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.30-23.50		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan		—
23 September	04.30-04.40	Three	Seysulan village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
24 September	04.28-04.40	Five	Garagashli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	09.35-09.40		Yusifjanli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	11.20-11.35 13.25-13.45		Unknown heights, Goygol region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	13.40-13.50		Yusifjanli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.00-19.05 21.30-22.00		Goyarkh and Gizil Oba villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
25 September	21.10-21.35 22.10-22.30	One	Horadiz village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.00-03.10		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
26 September	17.10-17.50	Five	Unknown heights, Krasnoselsk region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	19.40-19.50		Mosesgerkh village, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.50-19.45 21.30-21.40		Ashagi Seyidahmadli, Alakhanli and Ashagi Abdulrahmanli villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
27 September	04.50-05.20 02.15-02.45	Four	Gizil Oba village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.00-03.45		Marzili village, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	Azerbaijani soldier Taleh Abbasov was killed
	11.20-11.25 18.45-18.50		Unknown heights, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	23.30-23.40		Mehdili village, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Fire point area</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
28 September	06.30-06.50	Five	Goyarkh village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	13.10-13.40		Unknown heights, Berd region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.20-22.35		Unknown heights, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.21-22.45		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
29 September	00.30-00.50	Seven	Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	03.05-03.15		Shiklar and Bash Gervand villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	05.25-05.40				
	17.55-18.00		Voskevan village, Noyanberyan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	18.00-18.10		Berkaber village, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	22.00-22.15		Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
30 September	23.50-00.00	Four	Shuraabad village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	01.35-01.45		Unknown heights, Dashkesan region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
	09.50-10.20		Vozashen and Aygovin villages, Ijevan region, Armenia	Firearm and machine gun	—
	11.05-11.20		Unknown heights, Gadabay region, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—



Security Council

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Letter dated 15 October 2010 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the open debate of the Security Council which will be held on Monday, 18 October 2010, regarding the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.

(Signed) **Riyad Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer